On the judicial annulment of the ‘domestic’ trade moratorium in South African rhinoceros horn:a law and economics perspective by Collins, Alan et al.
Vol.:(0123456789)
European Journal of Law and Economics (2020) 49:361–372
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-020-09648-4
1 
On the judicial annulment of the ‘domestic’ trade 
moratorium in South African rhinoceros horn: a law 
and economics perspective
Alan Collins1 · Caroline Cox2 · Juniours Marire3
Published online: 10 April 2020 
© The Author(s) 2020
Abstract
The legalization of rhino horn ‘domestic’ trade in South Africa potentially unleashes 
market forces featuring new entry, new tastes and new rhino horn products. This 
risks escalating the rhino-poaching crisis further. It is argued that institutional con-
tradictions have been engendered by the South African High Court ruling in Kruger 
and another v Minister of Water and Environmental Affairs and others [2015] JOL 
34725, whose assumptions are shown to be highly restrictive and seemingly poorly 
informed about the true nature of demand for rhino horn and the dynamics of poach-
ing. The shortcoming in the legal decision-making pertains to not taking account of 
the absence of any evidence for the existence of domestic demand for rhino horns in 
South Africa. The key arguments presented herein align with support for the reinsti-
tution of the rhino horn trade moratorium, as well as administrative measures imple-
mented effectively to contain the poaching crisis.
Keywords Rhino horn trading · Trade ban · Trade moratorium · High Court of 
South Africa · Residual demand · Smuggling
JEL classification K11 · K32 · K42 · Q20
1 Introduction
The governance of biodiversity, and in the context of this study, specifically white 
and black rhinos (Ceratotherium simum and Diceros bicornis respectively), can be 
formally conceived of as a ‘wicked policy’ problem. Wicked policy problems have 
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been described as being not resolvable by linear, deterministic and uni-disciplinary 
solutions because there is no obvious identifiable best approach to resolving them 
(Gray and Gill 2009; Hartmann 2012; Rittel and Webber 1973). Any linear and 
deterministic solution will have several perverse consequences. Characteristically 
among such problems are divergent ideologies and solution positions that several 
different interest groups put forward. Wicked problems, therefore, require consensus 
building and the use of transdisciplinary processes (ecological, economic, commu-
nity development, education and training development) for the setting up of reason-
able and functional governance regimes.
The apparent fundamental problem of exclusion of species from a society’s port-
folio of biological assets may lead to various outcomes. This includes biological 
asset disinvestment, reallocation of institutional (management) services away from 
the biological asset and reallocation of habitat (land, water) from the biological 
asset to alternative biological assets (or other human activities) that have a higher 
return (Kontoleon et al. 2007; Swanson 1994). Since institutional services are scarce 
resources and base resources (habitat) are likewise scarce, they have many alterna-
tive human uses. A biological asset that does not earn a competitive return to war-
rant allocation of services and life-support resources to its cause will likely experi-
ence disinvestment and stock mining. The capacity to develop adequate institutional 
services depends on the rigour of the proposed solutions, which in turn depends on 
transdisciplinary understanding (ecological, economic, institutional, educational, 
community development etc.) of the dynamics of the poaching crises. This paper 
suggests that the decision of the South African court to reverse a 7-year domestic 
trade moratorium in rhino horns does not feature any marks of a decision process 
that was meaningfully informed by a transdisciplinary understanding of the rhino 
poaching crisis.
This paper is organized in the following manner. The next section sets out the 
legal arguments deployed in effecting a reversal of the rhino horn domestic trade 
moratorium in South Africa. Section 3 deploys a simple theoretical sketch to tease 
out what are very restrictive implicit assumptions in the court ruling to lift the mor-
atorium. Unintended economic and ecological consequences from the ruling are 
highlighted in the following section. The final section summarises the arguments 
made and offers some concluding reflective remarks, along with the beginnings of 
some proposed remedies.
2  Court reversal of the domestic trade moratorium
The South Africa High Court ruling, which was confirmed by the Supreme Court 
of Appeal and the Constitutional Court, demonstrates paradoxes of policymak-
ing in the presence of ‘wicked policy’ problems. It also posed a significant ques-
tion that underpinned the court’s reasoning and answered it with two obiter dicta. 
These were (1) that the reversal of the trade moratorium was inconsequential on 
rhino horn poaching outcomes and (2) that institutional failure in biodiversity gov-
ernance is the underlying problem in the rhino horn-poaching crisis. The court’s 
decision, in Kruger and another v Minister of Water and Environmental Affairs and 
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others [2015] JOL 34725, nullified the domestic rhino horn trade moratorium not on 
grounds of unconstitutionality, illegality, irrationality or unreasonableness, but on 
the ground of lack of substantive due process in the determination and imposition of 
the moratorium.
2.1  Background to the case
South Africa has the largest population of White Rhino (Ceratotherium simum) and 
Black Rhino (Diceros bicornis) in the world; however, it continues to face poaching 
on an unsustainable scale.1 Approximately two-thirds of the rhino population inhabit 
a number of state (publicly owned) parks and scientific reserves and the remain-
ing third are located in a large number of smaller private reserves. In response to 
the poaching crisis across publicly owned land and privately owned land within 
its national borders, the South African government put in place a moratorium on 
the domestic trade in rhino horns on the 13th February 2009. While the state does 
deploy public resources to protect rhino herds, law-abiding private reserve owners 
have been largely reliant on relatively high cost private security measures (Collins 
et  al. 2015). Aligned with the moratorium, such measures have been observed to 
imperil the profitability of private reserves. This has led to some less than law-abid-
ing private reserve owners to be complicit in poaching activities (or more accurately 
‘staged’ poaching and ‘staged’ permit—backed hunting activity) to boost revenues 
(Rademeyer 2012). Accordingly, there is increasingly active consideration of other 
tactics and regulatory models to protect herds and develop sustainable income 
streams for public and private reserves (see, for example, Collins et al. 2015; Rubino 
and Pienaar 2017, 2018; Rubino et al. 2018).
Data shows that whereas 13 rhinos had been poached in South Africa in 2007 by 
2009 this figure had risen to 122 (Save the Rhino 2019). The moratorium announced 
by the South African government was enacted following amendments to the ‘Threat-
ened’ or ‘Protected’ Species Regulations published in February 2007 (amended in 
January 2008).
The challenge against the moratorium was led by John Hume and Johan Kru-
ger, two South African rhino farmers and traders within South Africa of rhino 
horn. Hume, owner of the largest rhino farm (where he currently holds a stock of 
some 1500 rhino) aims to breed 200 rhino a year believing that his type of large 
scale rhino farming is ‘the recipe… to save the rhino from extinction’ (Richard-
son 2017). Central to their claim was that the Minister of Environmental Affairs 
had acted without ‘consulting’ rhino breeders and that as a result, the pre-mora-
torium consultation had been inadequate. In terms of the Government’s attempt 
to comply with the required consultation process, the Minister had published a 
notice in the National Gazette (Government Gazette 31301 Notice 835 of 8th 
August 2008), but not in any nationally distributed newspaper as additionally 
1 For an ongoing country-by-country record of poaching facts drawn from official and non-governmental 
organization sources see PoachingFacts (2020). See also Save the Rhino (2019).
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required by law, inviting the public to comment. It was considered that the notice 
was worded vaguely and without reasons for the action, such that no reasonable 
person could have raised any meaningful objection. The plaintiffs’ argument was 
that the moratorium was a taking of property without just compensation and that 
it was a taking away of their right to engage in a trade of their own choice. While 
the court did not comment much on the validity of this claim, it noted that “the 
moratorium has substantial [economic] consequences” (p. 10) on the plaintiffs. 
The court simply stated that it was “not necessary to express a final view on the 
right to property as enshrined in section 25 of the Constitution. It suffices to men-
tion that a valid point is made on the right of property and deprivation thereof 
occasioned by the moratorium” (p. 30).
The Minister’s rationale for instituting the moratorium was:
… to stem the flow of rhino horn into the international market and indirectly 
to curb the demand for horn and horn products which in turn may reduce 
poaching…The rationale behind the moratorium on domestic sale in rhino 
[was] two-fold. Firstly, to curb and reduce poaching of rhinos and secondly, 
to comply with the international market ban under CITES (p. 13).
The Department of Environmental Affairs had set in place an assortment of meas-
ures that could curb the rhino horn poaching crisis, not least,
…an audit of all existing stocking of rhino horn, … [ensuring] that every 
[audited] horn is tagged with a micro-chip, that DNA testing has been con-
ducted in the horn, and that all is measured, weighed, marked and captured 
on a national database management by the Department… enhance security 
at South Africa’s ports of exit… The provinces and other departments in the 
security cluster are improving their ev-ordination [sic] on law enforcement 
issues (pp. 28–29).
These envisaged measures are examples of investments in institutional (manage-
ment) services, using modern day technologies and inter-agency coordination 
mechanisms, to be able to effectively raise the transaction costs of poaching and 
thus help to reduce the rate of extinction of rhinos. In view of these measures, the 
court reasoned that,
…it is the implementation which is a problem and in my view, the problem 
in the implementation can only be placed at the Minister’s door steps…. 
Put differently, what disastrous implications would be brought about by the 
immediate lifting of the moratorium? I cannot think of any. The solution 
appears to lie in the effective implementation of applicable and envisaged 
measures (pp. 36–37).
The court understood that it was not demand reduction through a moratorium, but 
rather investment in adequate management services and effectively implementing 
the measures, that would stem the rhino horn haemorrhage in the long run. It is 
in this context that we pose the question: Is the lifting of the trade ban inconse-
quential? We argue that the court’s obiter dictum has several unintended perverse 
365
1 3
European Journal of Law and Economics (2020) 49:361–372 
consequences, not least potentially accelerating extinction of rhinos, signalling 
future market potential and fostering a sustained misunderstanding of domestic 
rhino horn demand. We, nonetheless, also argue that the second obiter dictum 
identifying institutional failure as the fundamental cause of the crisis is a broadly 
credible diagnosis. In what follows we develop an economic argument evaluating 
the court’s decision and its implications for rhino horn poaching.
3  Restrictive implicit assumptions in the court’s reasoning
In the following argument, we use Fig. 1, to weigh the assumptions of the court in 
arriving at the foregoing verdict. First, there is no evidence whatsoever of any truly 
‘local’ or ‘domestic’ demand for rhino horn within South Africa. Why the judge 
did not grasp this fundamental point, or was unwilling to grasp this point, is open to 
speculation. Use of powdered rhino horn as a part of Traditional Eastern or Chinese 
medicine within South Africa is not remotely significant. Currently, it could not sus-
tain a viable domestic market in its own right. That said, we cannot also completely 
discount the possibility that some extremely wealthy households may wish to pos-
sess a horn to use, for example, as a decorative doorstop. Accordingly, what is mis-
leadingly termed as local or domestic demand is in fact, by far, mostly speculative 
demand. This is because the ultimate objective is to sell the horn for a higher return 
elsewhere and crucially beyond South Africa’s borders. Some private reserve own-
ers and corrupt Government officials who have been complicit in cross border illegal 
smuggling of rhino horn (Rademeyer 2012) would be understandably keen to sustain 
Fig. 1  Co-existing varieties of demand for rhino horn in South Africa
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the fiction that there does exist a genuine domestic market. Such a market helps to 
feed the illegal export trade. A fictional domestic market simply makes it easier to 
launder legally traded items and divert them into an illegal export supply chain.
However, to take account of the less than negligible medical and decorative door-
stop domestic market we denote in Fig. 1 a very small portion of this local demand 
as ‘residual’—that is to say the genuine domestic market is extremely shallow. 
Lastly, there is international demand that is actually driving the poaching crisis. Fig-
ure 1 shows that the price premium between domestic rhino horn price and interna-
tional rhino horn price provides incentives for poaching for rent seekers.2 Since for-
eign demand is relatively inelastic, an increase in transaction costs of trading rhino 
horn domestically would shift the supply curve to the left, but quantities demanded 
internationally will decrease by a far smaller magnitude compared to quantities 
demanded domestically (Crookes and Blignaut 2015, 2016; Crookes 2017; Harvey 
2016).
However, the court’s reasoning seems to assume, first, that legalizing the domes-
tic rhino horn trade will automatically undermine illegal rhino horn markets. Sec-
ond, it assumes that rhino horn bans are completely ineffective. Third, the buoy-
ancy of the illegal rhino horn market emerges as a consequence of shortages created 
by the ban itself. Logically, this would mean legalizing the rhino horn trade will 
increase supply to the extent that illegal trade becomes unviable. This notion is 
extensively explored by Conrad and Lopes (2017) who show that reducing the price 
of rhino horn would not be effective at curbing poaching, without simultaneously 
increasing poacher costs. They find, however, that increasing poacher costs is not a 
realistic policy option since these costs are largely beyond the control of decision-
makers. The sensitivity of price to poaching effort are also found to have limiting 
implications for other methods advanced to reduce the value of rhino horn, such as 
synthetic rhino horn marketization and de-horning schemes.
Fourthly, the ruling assumes that legal rhino horn traders will willingly work 
together with law enforcement authorities to undermine the illegal market for rhino 
horn. There is also an assumption in this judgment that there is separability of 
domestic and international trade as well as between legal and illegal rhino horn mar-
kets. Lastly, the court assumes that institutional failure is to be blamed for the poach-
ing crisis. This last assumption is in large measure true. Had institutional effective-
ness been more evident, then the moratorium would likely have been more effective.
That said, the history of CITES-based literature convincingly concludes that 
legalization of the trade in endangered species has only hastened the extinction pro-
cess (Aguayo 2014). Instead, this body of work supports the view that a trade ban 
coupled with effective enforcement has led to population recovery for many endan-
gered species. Arguably, the incorporation of China as an official ivory trade partner 
2 Rhino farming (a theme that is beyond the scope of the current paper) has been argued to be poten-
tially able to contribute to reducing the size of the rhino horn price premium and thus reduce the severity 
of the poaching crisis. However, there is no consensus that this is the case in other endangered species 
domestic trade ban contexts. Findings have been, to say the least, mixed (see, for example, Kirkpatrick 
and Emerton 2010; Abbott and Van Kooten 2011; Conrad 2012; Tensen 2016).
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by the CITES Standing Committee, could have contributed in some measure to the 
escalation of the poaching crisis (Bennett 2015). Further, the rhino horn auction of 
August 2017, which is a direct outcome of the court’s ruling does not seem to have 
brought poaching down at all (Harvey 2017).
4  Unintended consequences of the court ruling
It can be plausibly contended that the extinction process is likely to be hastened 
by the lifting of the ban, simply because it creates incentives for new players to 
enter the market. To a greater extent, this is because inseparability of legal and 
illegal horn is patently a genuine possibility. Legalization reduces the transac-
tion costs of laundering illegal horn into the legal horn stream (Aguayo 2014). 
This arises since legalization reduces transaction costs of accessing the legal horn 
market.
In a related vein, legalization of the rhino horn trade, signals future mar-
ket potential (more market entry). New users, new rhino horn products and 
new distribution networks are likely to emerge. The market is likely to vastly 
expand. This leads to a very important further point, which is the weakness of 
the assumptions made in the court’s reasoning process. While the current size 
of the market for rhino horn is unknown, the predictable outcome of legaliza-
tion is some expansion in the market size. Potential demand is likely to increase, 
and this points to the problem of the unknown sensitivity of transaction costs to 
changes in the quantity demanded of rhino horn. Care should have been taken to 
realise that domestic demand for rhino horn in South Africa is, in practice, almost 
non-existent—effectively just comprising a minimal residual demand. Most of the 
‘domestic demand’ is actually for speculative purposes and principally interme-
diate in nature, for selling further on to the international market through illegal 
smuggling channels i.e. bypassing the international trade ban. Speculative forces 
can be powerful in endangered species product markets (Harvey et  al. 2017). 
Besides, without the knowledge of the price at which illegal traders are willing to 
abandon the illegal market, it is pointless to make restrictive assumptions about 
the structure of the market and the behaviour of players.
Finally, the lifting of the domestic trade moratorium sends confusing signals 
to the market and runs the risk of undermining the efficacy of demand-reduction 
campaigns in the real consumer markets in East Asia.
5  Summary and concluding remarks
The South African Department of Environmental Affairs annually releases sta-
tistics on the number of rhino poaching arrests. The most recent full year of 
these show that between 1 January and the 31 December 2018, 769 animals 
were poached. In the same year, 365 alleged rhino poachers and 36 alleged rhino 
horn traffickers were arrested across South Africa (DEA, Republic of South 
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Africa 2019). The South African Department of Environmental Affairs has more 
recently published its half year figures from the 1st to the 30th June 2019 (DEA, 
Republic of South Africa 2019) which show that during the period of January to 
June 2019, the number of rhino poached countrywide in South Africa was 318. 
This was a decrease compared to the same period in 2018 when 386 rhino were 
killed for their horns. Although the level of poaching has fallen since its peak in 
2014 (1215 rhinos poached according to DEA figures) this does not mean that 
the South African rhino population is thriving and it is the Kruger National Park 
(which is owned and managed by the South African state) which historically con-
tinues to be at risk. While this could be attributed to its extensive geographic 
boundaries (Save the Rhino 2019), it has recently been mitigated by substantial 
targeting of state counter poaching resources through the delineation of ‘inten-
sive protection zones’ within the park. However, this has been observed to lead to 
spatial displacement of poaching effort to other parks or private reserves (Mahr 
2016; Somerville 2017).
Despite the South African success in reducing poaching in recent years, rhino 
populations across the country are struggling to keep pace with current poaching 
rates while in some areas the populations are declining (DEA, Republic of South 
Africa 2019). While the South African government’s Integrated Strategic Manage-
ment of Rhinoceros plan is delivering successes in terms of the number of arrests 
linked to rhino poaching and smuggling, the Department of Environment, Forestry 
and Fisheries reports that “organised crime groups are exploiting rural, economi-
cally marginalised communities, neighbouring rhino reserves, particularly those in 
Mozambique and are undermining efforts at good governance and democracy, stim-
ulating corruption and introducing other forms of serious crime in these areas.”
While there are a number of government led initiatives in rural communities 
which abut the National Parks, aimed at educating local youths in the need to protect 
South Africa’s wildlife (and the rhino in particular) there is an argument that a more 
robust and militarised approach to rhino conservation is needed (Asiyanbi 2016; 
Barbora 2017; Massé and Lunstrum 2016; Verweijen and Marijnen 2018). Indeed, 
the South African government has already introduced military style technologies in 
its bid to protect its iconic wildlife. This includes the introduction of Intensive Pro-
tection Zones (IPZ) within National Parks equipped. The IPZs are equipped with 
Tactical Operations Centres which utilise military style sensor technology linked to 
fast responding reaction teams which are further connected to other law enforcement 
agencies (DEA, Republic of South Africa 2019). This integrated agency approach is 
already reaping rewards for South Africa’s law enforcement. On the 9 January 2019 
at ORTIA Cargo terminal, several cargo companies were approached by a joint team 
comprising members of the Police, the Hawks, customs and excise and the Depart-
ment of Environmental Affairs’ Environmental Management Inspectorate (Green 
Scorpions). The team was supported by K9 sniffer dogs to detect illegal wildlife 
trade products. Following the positive reaction of one of the detector dogs to a ship-
ment destined for Dubai, 116 kg of rhino horn pieces were discovered hidden under 
laminated wood (DEA, Republic of South Africa 2019).
The militarisation of conservation is a much debated subject. Indeed, the Kruger 
National Park has and continues to adopt military techniques to protect its iconic 
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species, including the rhino while the historic use of military techniques and weap-
ons threaten the wildlife it is trying to conserve (Lunstrum 2015). For the Kruger, 
the need for militarised protecting of the rhino came hand in hand with increases in 
cross-border poaching. As poaching incursions from Mozambique increased so did 
the military style training of the Kruger’s rangers.
South Africa National Parks (SANParks) has introduced an additional 150 rang-
ers inside Kruger who receive paramilitary style anti-poaching training. These new 
units operate in small groups employing tactical military skills (Lunstrum 2015). 
Ranger teams are supported by the Environmental Crime Investigation (ECI) Unit, 
a dedicated paramilitary style anti-poaching organisation which is equipped for 
longer-term covert operations within the Kruger National Park and intelligence 
gathering beyond the park’s borders (SANParks 2015).
The Kruger National Park is of vital importance to South Africa. As well as the 
rich ecology, its economic importance to the country is significant (more than one 
million tourists visit the park each year). It continues to share a long border with 
Mozambique. Recently, this border has been transformed through the development 
of the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park in 2002. This has led to the removal of 
large stretches of the apartheid-era fence, enabling the free movement of wildlife, 
and the opening of the Giriyondo Border Post which has enabled the cross-border 
movement of tourists (Lunstrum 2013). However, alongside these undoubted ben-
efits, the South African/Mozambique border is also the centre of the growth of rhino 
poaching. The increase in cross border poaching activity sees rhinos killed in South 
Africa, the majority in the Kruger National Park by Mozambican poachers. Horns 
are then taken back across the border where poaching syndicates are increasingly 
using Mozambican ports to ship rhino horn to the lucrative Asia market (Lunstrum 
2015).
Poachers that are caught are typically prosecuted using offences such as trespass-
ing or illegal firearm possession. Additionally, many arrested poachers evade the 
justice system by making bail and then fleeing to neighbouring countries such as to 
Mozambique (Lunstrum 2014). With no extradition treaty in place between South 
Africa and Mozambique, these individuals never face trial.
Since judicial rulings create new systems of rights and privileges, the arguments 
presented herein suggest that such decisions need to be informed by a more trans-
disciplinary process to minimise the dangers of creating perverse incentives. The 
legalization of rhino horn trade in the ‘domestic’ market of South Africa serves to 
set in motion consequential market forces that can escalate the poaching crisis in 
ways that spell doom to rhino species.
It is therefore important to re-institute the trade moratorium in South Africa while 
effectively implementing the assortment of administrative and regulatory measures 
that the South African Minister for Environmental Affairs has outlined for effective 
governance of rhinoceros horn. In addition, to enable prosecutors to charge alleged 
poachers with the primary act, a change in legislation is imperative. Additionally, 
the “escape route” to Mozambique needs to be tackled and this requires an extradi-
tion treaty to be put in place.
Finally, there remains the question of whether the militarisation of conservation 
within South Africa and the Kruger National Park in particular is a false dawn. The 
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Kruger lies in an area that has witnessed terrible historic conflict. Following the end 
of the Mozambican war in 1994, powerful military grade weapons have been left 
behind. Despite the efforts of international NGOs to collect and destroy them, many 
remain and have fallen into the hands of the poaching gangs. The wartime AK-47s 
are not used to kill rhino, hunting rifles are more than adequate for that, but to use 
against rangers protecting the wildlife. Meanwhile, since the 1980s the militarisation 
of rangers has continued. What began with arming rangers against the weapons of 
elephant poaching gangs has led to poachers in turn becoming increasingly heavily 
armed themselves. As this arms race has continued, concern amongst commentators 
has grown (Annecke and Masubelele 2016).
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